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Abstract 
 
The particular study is the first academic attempt to review a new financial instrument, the 
covered warrants, which were listed for trading in the Athens Exchange within the 
framework of the recapitalization of the three systematic Greek banks (Alpha Bank, 
National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank) in the summer of 2013. In particular, we 
discuss the basic characteristics of these instruments and we examine their pricing 
efficiency during the fifteen months of their listing. The empirical results suggest that the 
Greek warrants market is inefficient as the three listed contracts are systematically 
underpriced compared to their theoretical value based on the historic realized volatility of 
the underlying shares. Furthermore, a dynamic delta-hedged warrant portfolio yields 
significant cumulated gains that exceed the risk-free rate. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The particular study investigates a new segment of the Greek equity market, the covered 
warrants which were issued within the framework of the recapitalization of the Greek 
banks. The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) issued warrants for the ordinary 
shares of the three systematic banks (Alpha Bank, National Bank of Greece and Piraeus 
Bank) which it acquired in the share capital increases of 2013. The warrants were 
allocated at no cost to all private investors who participated in the recapitalization share 
capital increase (pro rata to their participation in the capital increase), in order to give 
them the opportunity to regain the control of the banks in the future. 
The Greek banking sector was severely hit over the past six years by the combined effects 
of deposit withdrawals, which could not be recouped by the international capital markets, 
the credit loss projections of their loan portfolios and the restructuring of the Greek 
sovereign debt through the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). These factors put pressure 
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on the liquidity and the capital base of Greek banks, which were required to raise new 
capital (Bank of Greece, 2012). In order to contribute to the maintenance of the stability 
of the Greek banking system, for the sake of public interest in July 2010 the Hellenic 
Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) was founded under Law 3864/2010. The HFSF has an 
initial duration until 30 June 2017, with a potential of a three-year extension if the 
Minister of Finance decides that this is necessary for fulfilment of its scope
3
.In March 
2012, the Bank of Greece carried out a conservative assessment of the capital needs of the 
Greek banking sector and published a relevant report entitled “Recapitalization and 
Restructuring of the Greek Banking Sector”. The strategic assessment identified four 
systematic (core) banks, namely Alpha Bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece and 
Piraeus Bank, which were considered suitable candidates for recapitalization using 
government funds. In November 2012 the ministerial Cabinet Act 38 determined the 
terms of the recapitalization framework and during the summer of 2013 the four 
systematic Greek banks were able to raise over €28 billion for their capital and liquidity 
needs. Almost 700,000 shareholders of the three banks
4
participated in the capital 
increases covering around 12% to 15% of the total recapitalization needs. The rest of 
funds were invested by the HFSF, but since the minimum capital (10%) to be paid by 
private investors was achieved, covered warrants were issued. Each warrant incorporated 
the right of its holder to buy from the HFSF a pre-determined number of ordinary shares 
that the HFSF has acquired by participating in the capital increase of each bank. 
This is the first academic attempt to discuss the basic characteristics of these warrants and 
investigate their pricing efficiency during the first 15 months of trading in Athens 
Exchange (ATHEX). In particular, we examine their market value compared to their 
theoretical value based on the historic realized volatility of the underlying shares and we 
investigate the performance of a dynamic delta-hedged warrant portfolio. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we concisely analyze the 
basic characteristics of the Greek warrants market, while the third section includes a 
discussion of the warrant valuation models and the concept of implied volatility. In 
section four, we empirically analyze the first year of trading for the warrants and we 
examine the relationship of realized volatility of the underlying shares and the volatility 
implied by warrants prices. The fifth section investigates the performance of a delta-
hedged warrant portfolio, while the last section includes the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2  Greek covered Warrants Specifications
5
 
 
Warrants are transferable securities listed on the Athens Exchange that were issued within 
the framework of the recapitalization of the Greek banks according to the special 
provisions of the Ministerial Council Act N.38. Each warrant gives its holder the right 
(but not the obligation) to buy a fixed number of underlying shares of the bank (owned by 
the HFSF), at a predetermined price (the strike price), on specific dates (exercise dates), 
until a predetermined time in the future (4.5 years or 54 months from the issue date of the 
warrants). The warrants are covered by the shares already held by the HFSF (acquired 
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during the share capital increase in 2013). This means that no new shares of the 
underlying banks are issued at each exercise, but already existing shares are used and 
hence, there is no dilution of existing shareholders as a result of exercise, since the total 
number of the bank’s shares outstanding remains unchanged. Thus, the particular warrants 
are Bermudan covered call options. 
Warrants holders can exercise their right to buy every six months, starting from the date 
which falls six months from the warrants issue date until the date which falls 4.5years 
from the warrants issue date, which is also the final expiration date (9 exercise periods in 
total). Warrants not exercised within this period will lapse and will be cancelled. The 
exercise price of the warrants is equal to the price that the HFSF paid for acquiring each 
of the banks’ shares at the recapitalization process, plus accrued interest, which is 
calculated by applying an annual interest rate of 3% increased by a spread of 1% for the 
first year, 2% for the second year, 3% for the third year, 4% for the fourth year and 5% 
for the remaining time. The Multiplier ratio is the number of shares (that HFSF owns) 
corresponding to one warrant which the holder may acquire upon exercise. This ratio was 
determined by the contribution of the private sector in the recapitalization offering for 
each bank and ranges from 4.47 ordinary shares per warrant (for Piraeus Bank) to 8.23 
ordinary shares per warrant (for National Bank of Greece). 
For a period of thirty-six months from the warrants issue date, the HFSF is not allowed to 
transfer the shares underlying the warrants to a third party (the only transfer allowed 
relates to the exercise of a warrant). After this period and until the expiration of the 
warrants, the HFSF provides a right of first refusal to warrant holders and if they choose 
not to acquire such shares, then the HFSF shall be entitled to transfer the underlying 
ordinary shares without being obliged to indemnify the warrant holders. 
Warrants are listed in the same market that the bank ordinary shares are listed in, that is in 
the ATHEX Securities Market and are registered in the Dematerialized Securities System 
(DSS), the registry and settlement system of Hellenic Exchanges. The trades are executed 
automatically and continuously in the trading system from 10:15 until 17:20. The only 
difference in their trading method compared to ordinary shares is how the opening and the 
closing prices are determined; the opening price is considered to be the price of the first 
trade executed in the respective market, while the closing price is defined as the price of 
the last trade concluded therein during the trading session
6
 (ATHEX Resolution No. 22). 
 
 
3  Valuation Models 
 
For the valuation of Bermudan warrants, there is no closed-form solution (as the Black-
Scholes pricing formula for European options) and only approximation methodologies 
exist. According to the relevant information memorandum of the Athens Exchange there 
are four methodologies for the calculation of the theoretical price of a Bermudan-style 
covered warrant. In particular, the first and simplest method is the use of an analytical 
option pricing model (e.g. the Black-Scholes formula) for valuing a European-style call 
option (with maturity in 4.5 years and exercise price the last available strike price). In this 
case, the Bermudan warrant is priced as a European call option ignoring the interim 
exercise periods. The second approach involves again the use of a closed-form model 
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(Black-Scholes) in order to value all nine European-style call options (with the respective 
exercise price and date) and then choose the highest estimated value, which will roughly 
correspond to the price of the Bermudan warrant. The third method is the use of 
algorithms that give an approximation to the option value
7
. Versendaal (2008) proposes 
the use as a benchmark for the lower bounds on a Bermudan call stock option the value of 
the corresponding European call option and as an upper bound benchmark the value of the 
corresponding look-back option. A look-back option allows its holder to pick the exercise 
moment at expiration, when all cash flows are known. Therefore the value of the look-
back option should be higher than the value of the Bermudan option, which does not 
allow foreknowledge. Finally, the fourth approach is the use of a modified binomial 
model. This is the method we are going to follow in our empirical analysis, since 
according to Versendaal (2008) for a one-dimensional underlying process (as the stock 
prices follow) a binary tree model and numerical procedures can be employed without any 
problem. 
 
3.1 Binomial or Cox, Ross και Rubinstein (CRR) Model 
 
The binomial model is particularly useful for pricing both simple American-style options 
and complex exotic options numerically, since it can deal with the possibility of early 
exercise. This method is only a reasonable approximation as it cannot provide an exact 
analytical solution as the Black-Scholes formula does. The binomial tree model was first 
proposed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) who show how the binomial pricing model 
arises from a discrete development of the geometric Brownian motion of the underlying 
asset. It is based on the assumption of risk neutrality according to which all investors 
require no compensation for risk. Under the risk neutrality assumption, the option can be 
simply priced as the expected value of its future payoff discounted by the risk free rate. 
The CRR model breaks down the option’s time to expiration into potentially very 
large number of time intervals, or steps. At any point of time (step) the price of the 
underlying asset St has only two possibilities to move: either the price moves up at a 
constant rate u and with probability p or the price moves down at a constant rate d and 
with probability 1-p. The up and down rates are calculated using the annualized volatility 
of the underlying asset and the time duration of a step (measured in years). At the final 
step (i.e. at expiration of the option) the option value is simply its intrinsic value. The 
option value is found recursively for each step, working backwards in time (for time n-1, 
n-2 etc.) as the present value of the expected value of its future payoffs.In particular the 
value of a call option Ct is given by the following formula: 
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The CRR model is a discrete version of the Black-Scholes model, but as the time interval 
tends to zero, the two processes converge. In the case of a Bermudan call warrant the 
above described methodology should be slightly modified. In particular, at each node the 
possibility of early exercise should be evaluated; when early exercise is allowed the value 
of the warrant is the maximum between the exercise value and the binomial (model 
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estimated) value, while when early exercise is not allowed, only the binomial value is 
relevant (Cox et al, 1979).   
 
3.2 Implied Volatility: Definitions and Analogies 
 
The value of an option depends on the following six variables: the spot price of the 
underlying share at the moment of valuation, the strike price, the dividend yield(if any), 
the risk-free rate, the remaining time until maturity and the volatility of the underlying 
asset over the life of the option. By attributing values to the above factors, the option 
valuation model results in an estimate of the option’s theoretical fair value. Since options 
usually trade in an organized market, we could consider their market price as their fair 
price. In that case, and since all the other five variables (except volatility) are fairly 
objectively determined, we could use the pricing model in order to solve for volatility 
(instead of price). In that way, we can calculate the volatility of the underlying asset 
implied by the current market price, which can be considered as the market forecast/ 
estimate for the volatility of the underlying asset over the remaining life of the option. 
An analogy between interest rates and implied volatility contributes in understanding the 
latter. There is a direct correspondence between the role of interest rate in bond pricing 
and the role of implied volatility in option pricing. Volatility can be viewed as one of the 
determinant factors of an option pricing model (e.g. Black-Scholes or CRR); as any bond 
has its specific yield-to-maturity (YTM), each option corresponds into a specific implied 
volatility level. Yield-to-maturity is the market implied yield of each bond. In the same 
way as a specific implied volatility level can be translated through an option pricing 
model into a specific option price, a specific YTM can be translated through the 
discounted cash flow equation into a specific bond price. 
 
 
4  Empirical Analysis of the Greek Warrants Market 
 
Our sample covers the whole period of warrants trading in the Athens Exchange (until 
October 2014). Particularly, the period under review for the warrant of Alpha Bank 
(ALPHAW) is June 11, 2013 until October 27, 2014 (345 observations), for the warrant 
of National Bank of Greece (NBGW) the period under review is from June 27,until 
October 27, 2014 (334 observations) and finally for the warrant of Bank of Piraeus 
(TPEIRW) the period under review starts on July 3, 2013 and ends on October 27, 2014 
(330 observations). 
Figure 1 depicts the price development of the three pairs under examination. It is obvious 
that the share and the respective warrant prices move in tandem. The correlation 
coefficient of the returns of the stock and the warrant is statistically significant in all three 
cases and hovers around 64% for Alpha Bank, 61% for National Bank of Greece and 59% 
for Bank of Piraeus. Figure 2 portrays the relative performance of the stock versus the 
respective warrant. The initial base price for the warrant is neither the initial price of each 
warrant (whichwasatheoreticalpricecalculatedbytheexchangebasedoncertainassumptions
8
) 
at which no actual transaction took place, nor the opening or the closing price of the first 
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day of trading. Furthermore, in order to calculate the relative performance for each pair, 
we exclude the first month of trading, since warrants were new and unknown financial 
instruments for the Greek market. The warrant written on Alpha Bank is the only one 
over- performing the underlying stock, while NBGW and TPEIRW performed worse 
compared to their respective ordinary shares. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the stock price and the volatility implied 
by each warrant (in inverted scale). The link between these two measures seems stronger 
(compared to link between share and warrant prices). This is also confirmed by the 
correlation coefficients between the daily stock returns and the daily changes in implied 
volatility for each warrant, which are higher compared to respective coefficients of stock 
and warrant returns. In particular, the correlations are over -68% for Alpha, over -85% for 
NBG and around -64% for Bank of Piraeus. The correlation coefficient for NBGW is 
remarkable and it can be potentially explained by the fact that the particular warrant was 
the only one that was consistently out-of –money (with very exception over this 15-month 
period) and thus it only had time value, as its intrinsic value was zero. 
 
4.1 Implied and Realized Volatility 
 
Figure 4 shows the volatility implied by the market price of each warrant and the 
respective historic 20-day annualized realized volatility for each bank. It is obvious that 
implied volatility is significantly lower than realized volatility in all three cases. In the 
case of Bank of Piraeus, the realized volatility is significantly lower in all 330 days under 
review. A similar difference is recorded for the case of National Bank of Greece, while in 
the case of Alpha Bank the difference between the two volatility measures is slightly 
lower. In particular, for the period under review the difference between realized and 
implied volatility is 11.6% in the case of Alpha, 31.5% in the case of National Bank of 
Greece and 27.5% in the case of Bank of Piraeus. In order to examine the significance of 
this difference we run an equality test of the means; the t statistic suggests that the null 
hypothesis (of equality) is rejected at the 99% confidence level in all three cases. Table 2 
includes the descriptive statistics of implied and 20-day realized volatility for the three 
banks. The median prices do not differ substantially from the average values, while the 
standard deviation difference confirms the well documented fact that implied volatility is 
a smoothed expectation of future realized volatility, as it exhibits lower variations. In 
concluding the preliminary analysis, it is also worth analyzing the number of observations 
for each series; particularly, for Alpha Bank, we were able to calculate an implied 
volatility measure only for 219 out of the total 345 trading days. The reason for this 
inability is that during these 126 trading days, ALPHAW was trading below its intrinsic 
value, thus it was not possible to derive an implied volatility estimate. For the other two 
warrants the mispricing was much more limited; only 4 out of the total 334 trading days 
for NBGW and 11 out of 330 for the warrant of Bank of Piraeus. 
Therefore, in terms of volatility all three warrants under review are significantly 
undervalued. The particular finding is in contrast to Chang et al (2013) who find that the 
market prices of warrants in the Chinese market are much higher systematically than the 
Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility. Warrants’ mispricing in the Greek market 
can be possibly explained by the absence of institutional investors, who either don’t invest 
in Athens Exchange due to its limited size and liquidity, or they are not allowed to invest 
in derivative instruments. Another possible explanation relates to the limitations of short 
selling in the Greek stock exchange (as it is generally difficult and expensive to borrow 
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shares); short selling would have been the market mechanism that would adjust the price 
relationship between warrants and underlying stocks, as market participants need to buy 
the undervalued warrant and short-sell the ordinary shares. A third explanation doesn’t 
relate to the characteristics of the Greek equity market, but has to do with the well-
documented mean reversion property of volatility. Several academic papers (indicatively 
Poterba and Summers, 1988) have shown that periods of high (low) volatility are 
generally ensued by periods of average/ normal volatility. Therefore, long-term forecast/ 
estimates of volatility embed its mean reversion property and assume that sooner or later 
volatility will revert back to a normal level. Of course, even though the mean reversion 
property is indisputable, market participants do not necessarily agree on what the level of 
the normal volatility should be, since market conditions are dynamic. 
Now, regarding the realized volatility of the three banks under review, examining the 
historic volatility of their ordinary share returns for a longer period of time we can 
potential reconcile the warrants mispricing. In particular, we calculate the annualized 20-
day realized volatility over the last decade (from 01/01/2004 until 10/27/2014). The first 
outright observation is the striking similarity of the estimated measures. The average 
historic volatility hovers around 55% for all three banks (this happens to be the realized 
volatility of NBG and Bank of Piraeus for the warrants’ trading period as well). We 
should note however, that the average volatility of the decade is biased from the elevated 
uncertainty that followed the fiscal and credit crisis that started in 2010. For the period 
2010-2014 the average realized volatilities reach almost 80% for the three banks. The 
average historic volatility is significantly lower during the period 2004-2010 (and it is 
even lower if we also exclude the 2008-2009 period). Specifically, for the period 2004-
2010 the average historic 20-day volatility for the three banks hovers around 35%; this 
level is closer to the volatility implied by the warrant prices on average during the last 15 
months. Hence, we could conclude that market participants expect that future realized 
volatility of the Greek banking sector will lower and revert back to more normal levels. 
Since all three warrants under review appear to be undervalued in terms of volatility, 
investors could open a combined position in the ordinary shares and the warrants of the 
three banks in order to take advantage of this mispricing. In particular, investors should 
sell the underlying shares and buy warrants. In the next section we are going to 
investigate the potential profits of a dynamic delta neutral position in ordinary shares and 
warrants. 
 
 
5  Delta-hedged Warrant Portfolio 
 
The delta of the option is the first derivative of the options price with respect to the 
underlying price. The delta of the underlying equals unity. Assuming that an investor 
holds a short position in a stock option (contract size one share) and at the same time buys 
delta shares of the underlying stock, then his/ her combined position is completely hedged 
(at least for small move in the underlying price). According to the Black and Scholes 
assumptions, the dynamic rebalancing of the portfolio as the price of the underlying 
moves in order to keep the total delta of the position equal to zero will result in a fully-
protected portfolio which should result in a return equal to the risk-free rate. In case 
though the option is not fairly valued (if for example the volatility parameter used for the 
option pricing is higher or lower than it should be), then the delta neutral position will 
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yield higher returns. Thus, if an investor thinks that the implied volatility of an option is 
higher than the expected realized volatility of the underlying asset during the life of the 
option, then he/ she should short the option and hedge by buying the underlying stock. 
The opposite is true in case the option’s implied volatility is lower than the expected 
realized volatility. 
Following Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) we calculate the cumulative profits of the delta-
neutral position as follows: 
 
𝜋 𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡 − 𝑊0 −  𝛥𝑡−1 𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡−1 
𝑡
𝑛=0 +  𝑟(𝛥𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝑊𝑡−1)
1
360
𝑡
𝑛=0                   (2) 
 
In which, Wt is the price of warrant on day t (W0 is the warrant price on the first day of the 
hedge
9
),  Stis the price of the underlying bank share, is the risk-free rate andΔtis the delta 
of the warrant
10
. Therefore, delta profits consist of the capital gains/ losses from the 
warrant position, the capital gains/ losses from the stock position and the daily interest 
received. We calculate the cumulative profits in euros for a hypothetical position of 100 
warrants. 
Figure 6 includes the cumulative profits of the three delta-neutral positions. The 
conclusion is not inclusive, but it seems that there is a potential of accumulating profits by 
opening a long position in the warrants market and hedging it by selling the underlying 
stock. The cumulative profits are positive, but they are not statistically significant in the 
daily level. However, we believe that an investor can accumulate higher profits if he/ she 
follows a delta-neutral hedging based on the level of the implied volatility of the warrant 
and not just hold a continuous delta-neutral position. Furthermore, the delta estimate can 
be improved either by using alternative models (indicatively Baksi et al, 1997) or by 
modifying the Black and Scholes delta (following Derman et al, 1996 andColemanetal, 
2001). According to Vähämaa (2004) and the references herein, although time-varying 
volatility option pricing models definitely outperform the Black and Scholes model in 
terms of pricing, they do not necessarily result in better hedging performance. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Within the framework of the recapitalization of the Greek banks during the summer of 
2013, new securities were issued and started trading in the Athens Exchange, covered 
warrants. The current article is the first academic attempt to analyze the characteristics of 
this new market, which consists of the warrants of the three systematic Greek banks 
(Alpha Bank, National Bank of Greece and Bank of Piraeus). 
The three warrants under review appear to be undervalued in terms of volatility, as their 
implied volatility is significantly lower than the historic realized volatility of the 
underlying ordinary shares for the most part of their trading history. The average volatility 
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The first day of the delta-neutral hedging is not the actual first day of trading, but one month after 
the first listing (although the results are not significantly different in any case. 
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In order to calculate Δ, we employ the Black and Scholes model using the following 
assumptions: the strike price and the exercise date is the following exercise allowed by the terms of 
the warrant (and not the final one) and the volatility input is set equal to 35% (average historic 
realized volatility of the last decade). 
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implied by the warrant of Alpha Bank is30.4% (while the historic 20-day realized 
volatility of shares of Alpha during the same period is 42%), the implied volatility of 
NBGW is 22.6% (while the respective realized volatility is 54.1%) and the volatility 
implied by the Bank of Piraeus warrant is 27.5% (realized volatility equal to 55%).This 
divergence can be reconciled by a combination of factors which relate to both the 
characteristics of the Greek equity market (e.g. absence of large institutional investors or 
limited availability of shares to be borrowed in order to be short-sold) and the mean 
reversion property of volatility. The realized volatility during the last years (due to the 
Greek fiscal crisis) is extremely elevated compared to the historical average and thus, it is 
likely that market participants are currently pricing into warrants (which have long 
maturity) a reversion back to normal volatility levels. 
In concluding, future relevant research could involve, among other, the pricing of the 
particular Bermudan warrants with dynamic volatility pricing models, the investigation of 
the relationship between moneyness and implied volatility and the construction of more 
advanced delta-neutral strategies (e.g. using several threshold levels). Finally, an attempt 
to improve the delta hedging performance by adjusting the Black and Scholes derived 
delta could be applied in the Greek market. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Warrants’ Specifications 
Underlying asset Alpha Bank National Bank of 
Greece 
Piraeus Bank 
Warrant type 
Covered Bermudan 
Call  
Covered Bermudan 
Call 
Covered Bermudan 
Call 
Total warrants 
issued 
1,143,803,533 245,748,459 843,640,590 
Issue Date Jun 10, 2013 Jun 26, 2013 Jul 2, 2013 
Initial price
1
 
(€/warrant)  
€1.45 €6.83 €0.899 
Date of maturity Dec 10, 2017 Dec 26, 2017 Jan 2, 2018 
Settlement 
method 
Physical Delivery Physical Delivery Physical Delivery 
Multiplier ratio
2
 7.40868307 shares 
8,22923881005499 
shares 
4.47577327722 
shares 
    
Exercise Prices 
and Dates 
Exercise 
Date 
Strike 
Price 
Exercise 
Date 
Strike 
Price 
Exercise 
Date 
Strike 
Price 
Dec 10, 
2013 
0.4488 Dec 26, 
2013 
4.3758 Jan 2, 2013 1.734 
Jun 10, 
2014 
0.4576 Jun 26, 
2014 
4.4616 Jul 2, 2014 1.768 
Dec 10, 
2014 
0.4686 Dec 26, 
2014 
4.56885 Jan 2, 2015 1.8105 
Jun 10, 
2015 
0.4796 Jun 26, 
2015 
4,6761 Jul 2, 2015 1.853 
Dec 10, 
2015 
0.4928 Dec 26, 
2015 
4.8048 Jan 2, 2016 1.904 
Jun 10, 
2016 
0.5060 Jun 26, 
2016 
4.9335 Jul 2, 2016 1.955 
Dec 10, 
2016 
0.5214 Dec 26, 
2016 
5.08365 Jan 2, 2017 2.0145 
Jun 10, 
2017 
0.5368 Jun 26, 
2017 
5.2338 Jul 2, 2017 2.074 
Dec 10, 
2017 
0.5544 Dec 26, 
2017 
5.4054 Jan 2, 2018 2.142 
1
The initial price of each warrant was set according to ATHEX Resolution No. 33 
2
 The number of underlying shares corresponding to 1 warrant, if exercised. 
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Table A2: Summary statistics of Implied and 20-day Realized Volatility 
 Alpha Bank National Bank  Piraeus Bank 
 Implied Realized Implied Realized Implied Realized 
Mean 0.304 0.420 0.226 0.541 0.2751 0.550 
Median 0.316 0.425 0.234 0.523 0.274 0.545 
Maximum 0.470 0.594 0.358 0.953 0.431 0.807 
Minimum 0.150 0.225 0.079 0.320 0.073 0.312 
Std. Dev. 0.057 0.082 0.070 0.140 0.075 0.104 
Skewness -0.329 -0.173 -0.236 0.672 -0.234 0.136 
Kurtosis 2.519 2.291 1.771 2.750 2.825 2.710 
# Obs. 219 345 330 334 319 330 
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Figure A1: Stocks and Warrants Daily prices 
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Figure A2: Stocks and Warrants Daily Returns 
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Figure A3: Stocks Daily prices and implied volatility 
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Figure A4: Implied and Realized Volatility (20d) 
5%
15%
25%
35%
45%
55%
65%
75%
85%
Bank of Piraeus
Implied Vol Realized Vol (20 d)
An Analysis of the Covered Warrants listed on the Athens Exchange                               29 
 
 
 
Figure A5: 20-day Realized Volatility (2004-2014) 
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Figure A6: Dynamic Delta Hedging Cumulative profits 
